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PUBLIC POLICY AS AN EXCEPTION TO FREE 
MOVEMENT WITHIN THE INTERNAL MARKET AND THE 
EUROPEAN JUDICIAL AREA: A COMPARISON
Tena Hoško*
Summary: This article compares the public policy exception to free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital (the four freedoms) 
with the public policy exception to free movement of judgments (the 
fifth freedom). A comparison is made on the basis of the following 
elements: types of public policy (domestic, international, purely inter-
national; European; substantive and procedural), restrictiveness of 
interpretation, variability, content, nature and the addressees of pro-
tection. The conclusion is that there is only one concept of public policy 
that varies from time to time and from Member State to Member State, 
although there are some differences in the operation of the uses in the 
two areas of public policy.
1. Introduction
The European Union (hereinafter: EU) is based on the free movement 
of goods, services, persons, and capital,1 known as the four freedoms. 
In order to secure the impeccable functioning of the internal market, a 
‘fifth freedom’2 has emerged in the Brussels Convention3 and the follow-
ing Brussels I Regulation4 – the free movement of judgments.5 Although 
all of these freedoms are of utmost importance for the EU, there are some 
restrictions to them. Restrictions are necessary since there are still spe-
cificities of each Member State’s legal order that need to be safeguarded, 
notwithstanding the well-functioning internal market.6 One of these is 
* Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. The author is grateful to Dr Justin Borg-Barthet for 
his comments on an earlier draft of the paper. All errors are the author’s alone. 
1 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty), Titles II and IV.
2 This paper will be limited to the public policy exceptions to the five freedoms. For a com-
prehensive review of public policy in the EU, see Tim Corthaut, EU Ordre Public (Wolters 
Kluwer 2012).
3 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters (Brussels Convention).
4 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the rec-
ognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Brussels I Regula-
tion) [2001] OJ L12/1.
5 Brussels I Regulation (n 4), Recital 6 of the Preamble; Jerca Kramberger Škerl, ‘Euro-
pean Public Policy (With an Emphasis on Exequatur Proceedings)’ (2011) 7 JPIL 461, 480.
6 Corthaut (n 2) 79.
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the public policy of the Member State of destination, or the Member State 
of recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment. 
The modern private international law doctrine of public policy was 
developed in the 19th century. Joseph Story argued that ‘foreign laws 
which are repugnant to fundamental principles of the lex fori, or to reli-
gion or morality, cannot claim adoption under the general comity of na-
tions’.7 Already then, it was held that the State should be allowed to pro-
tect its own fundamental principles when there was a dispute involving 
a foreign element. Such importance of public policy was perceived by the 
founding EU Member States who ‘realised that member states may wish 
to enhance different values and differentiate in the way they deal with 
certain activities’.8 The public policy exception to the four freedoms was 
thus introduced from the start in the Treaty of Rome of 1957.9 Although 
the European Communities, now the European Union, had the conver-
gence of laws and economic policy as their goal from the very beginning,10 
it was reasonable to include such an exception and not to expect com-
plete equality between the Member States.
The public policy of a state is not easy to define due to its variability 
in space and time.11 However, the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinaf-
ter: CJEU, the Court) has developed some standards for its application 
both in the context of public policy as a justification for the restriction 
of the four freedoms (Article 36 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (hereinafter: TFEU) for goods, Article 45 TFEU for work-
ers, Article 52 TFEU for establishment, Article 65 TFEU for capital and 
payments (hereinafter: the four freedoms public policy))12 and public pol-
icy as a justification for the restriction of the fifth freedom (Article 34(1) 
Brussels I (hereinafter: the judgments public policy)).13 It is thus to be 
established whether a parallel can be drawn between the two. Rushed 
conclusions are unwelcome because there are both similarities and dif-
ferences between the two.14 The CJEU, willingly or not, is interpreting 
7 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: Foreign and Domestic, in Regard 
to Contracts, Rights, and Remedies, and Especially in Regard to Marriages, Divorces, Wills, 
Successions, and Judgments (2nd edn, Edmund Hatch Bennett 1872) para 373ff.
8 Catherine Kessedjian, ‘Public Order in European Law’ (2007) 1 Erasmus LR, 25, 28.
9 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community of 25 March 1957, art 36 for 
goods, art 48 for workers and art 56 for establishment. Art 73 d for capital and payments 
was added by the Maastricht Treaty on Establishing European Community of 7 February 
1992.
10 ibid, Preamble and art 2.
11 Stéphanie Francq, ‘Article 34’ in Ulrich Magnus and Peter Mankowski (eds), Brussels I 
Regulation (1st edn, Sellier 2007) para 15.
12 Lisbon Treaty (n 1), 
13 The paper will focus on the Brussels I Regulation since there is no CJEU case law re-
garding the other legislation on recognition and enforcement of judgments.
14 Examination of all the linguistic versions, except Gaelic which is inaccessible for Brus-
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the usages of public policy in both areas in a similar fashion, but their 
addressees, content, nature and operation are sometimes different. Still, 
it is submitted that the difference in usage is not of such a nature as to 
amount to the creation of two different notions, or to the splitting of the 
one into two separate notions. 
This paper will firstly present public policy as used within the re-
striction of the four freedoms and then in EU private international law. 
One early CJEU decision for each area will be elaborated – Van Duyn v 
Home Office15 and Krombach v Bamberski.16 They were mostly followed 
in the later CJEU jurisprudence and they depict the basic features of 
the operation and content of public policy. Other relevant case law will 
be used throughout the paper. After that, several types of public policy 
will be discussed – domestic, international and purely international; Eu-
ropean; substantive and procedural public policy – in order to see how 
they act in the context of the five freedoms. The paper will then discuss 
the similarities and differences between the usages of public policy in the 
two areas in the EU. The similarities are found in its strict interpretation, 
the variability of the notion, and the violation of a fundamental value 
needed to establish contrariety of public policy. The differences are based 
on the discriminatory nature of the four freedoms public policy, on the 
protection of different addressees’ human rights and on the protection of 
an economic interest. Lastly, the paper will assess the comparison of the 
‘two public policies’ in order to determine whether there is only one no-
tion of public policy within the EU. 
2. Public policy in the EU internal market law
2.1 General observations
It is a mission of the EU to ensure free circulation of four factors of 
production – goods, services, persons, and capital – since this is the only 
way to create an economically connected community (an internal mar-
ket), which is the primary goal of the EU. The mutual recognition of the 
four freedoms between Member States does not produce absolute rights. 
Restrictions are allowed, but are to be applied restrictively. As a restric-
sels I, of the relevant legislation shows that there is no difference in naming the two excep-
tions in most languages. However, differences occur in Bulgarian (‘публичната политика’ 
and ‘обществен ред’), Danish (‘grundlæggende retsprincipper’ and ‘offentlige orden’), Finn-
ish (‘oikeusjärjestyksen perusteita’ and ‘yleisen järjestyksen’), Hungarian (‘közrendjével’ and 
‘közrend’), Maltese (‘l-istrateġija pubblika’ and ‘ordni pubbliku’) and Swedish (‘rättsordningen’ 
and ‘allmän ordning’). Without going into linguistic nuances, the private international law 
notion is named ‘public policy’ and the Treaty notion could be best translated as ‘public 
order’ or ‘law and order’. For more, see Kessedjian (n 8) 25-26.
15 Case 41-74 Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office [1974] ECR 01337.
16 Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski [2000] ECR I-01935.
192 Tena Hoško: Public Policy as an Exception to free Movement within the...
tion to the four freedoms, public policy stands side by side with public 
security and even public morality, the protection of the health and life of 
humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures possess-
ing artistic, historic or archaeological value, and the protection of indus-
trial and commercial property in the case of the free movement of goods 
(Article 36 TFEU). Therefore, public policy does not include the other 
enumerated exceptions. In the case of judgments public policy, there are 
no similar exceptions to the ones for the four freedoms. However, the 
Brussels I Regulation adds several more reasons for refusing recognition 
and enforcement of a foreign judgment: breach of the defendant’s right to 
be heard due to lack of adequate service, an irreconcilable domestic judg-
ment, and an irreconcilable foreign judgment that is susceptible to rec-
ognition and enforcement in the state of recognition and enforcement.17
Although the public policy exception exists for all four freedoms and 
is most often interpreted in an analogous fashion,18 there are some dif-
ferences in the application of the exception. By way of example, public 
policy is often considered together with public security in the case of free 
movement of persons.19 When deciding on a person’s right to enter and 
reside in a foreign Member State, his or her personal conduct is relevant 
and an analysis of both restrictions at the same time provides for a com-
plete review.20 Still, the nuances in approach to the four freedoms public 
policy are not so major as to impede a comparison of the four freedoms 
and the free movement of judgments. 
2.2 Van Duyn v Home Office – how the exception operates
In one of the most important judgments dealing with the direct ap-
plicability of EU law and exceptions to the free movement of workers, 
Van Duyn v Home Office, the dispute arose before the English court. The 
case involved a Dutch citizen, Mrs Van Duyn, who was denied leave to 
enter the United Kingdom since she was to be employed by the Church of 
Scientology whose activity was disapproved by the British Government. 
17  Brussels I Regulation (n 4) art 34/2-4. These other reasons prevail in application over 
the public policy exception (see Aurelio Lopez-Tarruella, ‘The Public Policy Clause in the 
System of Recognition and Enforcement of the Brussels Convention’ (2000-2001) ELF 122, 
126-127.
18 Alan Dashwood and Derrick Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law (6th 
edn, Hart 2011) 571.
19 See eg Case 30-77 Régina v Pierre Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1977 01999; Joined cases 
115 and 116/81 Rezguia Adoui v Belgian State and City of Liège; Dominique Cornuaille v 
Belgian State [1982] ECR 01665; Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The 
four freedoms (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 481.
20 Barnard (n 19) 482-485.
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In the preliminary ruling procedure, the national court firstly asked 
whether the provisions on free movement of workers and on justifications 
to their restrictions stemming from the Treaty and Directive No 64/221 
of 25 February 1964 on the co-ordination of special measures concerning 
the movement and residence of foreign nationals were directly applicable. 
The CJEU held that those provisions ‘confer on individuals rights which 
are enforceable by them in the courts of a member state and which the 
national courts must protect’21 and are to be applied directly by the na-
tional courts.
The second question answered by the CJEU dealt with the restric-
tion to free movement of workers based on public policy. The activities 
of the Church of Scientology were not unlawful in the United Kingdom. 
However, the State considered them to be socially harmful and employed 
administrative measures to counteract them. The CJEU held that the 
lack of illegality of a certain conduct does not lead to the impossibil-
ity to invoke the violation of public policy and concluded that ‘the par-
ticular circumstances justifying recourse to the concept of public policy 
may vary from one country to another and from one period to another’.22 
It was emphasised that although the United Kingdom does not impose 
similar measures on its own nationals in similar circumstances, it is not 
prohibited under the principle of non-discrimination to prevent foreign 
nationals to enter its territory. As the CJEU said, this is a consequence 
of the international law principle that a state cannot prohibit its own na-
tionals from entering its territory.23 
The CJEU also tackled the question of the scope of applicability of 
the restriction to the free movement of workers based on public policy by 
stating that ‘the concept of public policy in the context of the Community 
and where, in particular, it is used as a justification for derogating from 
the fundamental principle of freedom of movement for workers, must be 
interpreted strictly’.24 The framework for this strict interpretation was set 
in subsequent case law where the CJEU concluded that only ‘a genuine 
and sufficiently serious threat to the requirements of public policy affecting 
one of the fundamental interests of society’25 could amount to a violation 
of public policy. The main lessons to be learned from the Court’s interpre-
tation of the public policy exception are best reiterated in a recent case:
The Court has always emphasised that while Member States es-
sentially retain the freedom to determine the requirements of 
21 Van Duyn (n 15) para 15.
22 ibid, para 18.
23 ibid, para 22.
24 ibid, para 18.
25 Bouchereau (n 19) para 35.
194 Tena Hoško: Public Policy as an Exception to free Movement within the...
public policy and public security in accordance with their na-
tional needs, which can vary from one Member State to another 
and from one era to another, the fact still remains that, in the 
European Union context and particularly as justification for a 
derogation from the fundamental principle of free movement of 
persons, those requirements must be interpreted strictly, so that 
their scope cannot be determined unilaterally by each Member 
State without any control by the institutions of the European 
Union.26 
3. Public policy in the EU private international law 
3.1 General observations
The secondary legislation regulating the ever more important fifth 
freedom in the EU, namely Articles 34 and 57 of the Brussels I Regulation,27 
Articles 22 and 13 of Brussels II bis,28 Articles 24 and 34 of the Mainte-
nance Regulation,29 and Article 40 of the Succession Regulation30 allow 
for non-recognition or non-enforcement of judgments on the basis of the 
public policy of the state of recognition. Besides, violation of the public 
policy of the forum might be an excuse for the non-application of foreign 
law under Article 21 of the Rome I,31 Article 26 of the Rome II,32 and Article 
12 of the Rome III33 regulations and Article 25 of the Succession Regula-
26 Case C-434/10 Petar Aladzhov v Zamestnik director na Stolichna direktsia na vatreshnite 
raboti kam Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti [2011] ECR I-11659, para 34.
27 Brussels I Regulation (n 4).
28 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters 
of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 OJ L338/1.
29 Council Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable 
law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to main-
tenance obligations OJ L7/1. It has to be mentioned that due to two different recognition 
and enforcement systems in the Maintenance Regulation, the public policy exception only 
applies to maintenance decisions coming from states not bound by the Hague Protocol of 23 
November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, namely Denmark and 
the United Kingdom.
30 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 
2012 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and accept-
ance and enforcement of authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the crea-
tion of a European Certificate of Succession OJ L201/107.
31 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 
2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I) OJ L177/6.
32 Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 
2007 on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ L199/40.
33 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010 implementing enhanced 
cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation (Rome III) OJ 
2010 L343/10.
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tion.34 The public policy exception as used in EU private international law 
was already part of the national laws in Europe35 and today it continues 
to form a valuable device for the protection of the domestic legal order.
Notwithstanding the fact that the EU strives to create an ‘ever closer 
Union’,36 the EU Member States have not yet reached such a similarity in 
basic principles, fundamental values and protection of human rights to 
completely abandon the public policy exception.37 Indeed, this exception 
to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments has been kept in the 
Recast of the Brussels I Regulation that will come into force in January 
2015.38 This basically means that in the case of a dispute with a foreign 
element, Member States may avail themselves of the negative function39 
of the public policy to prevent the unwanted effects40 of foreign law or of 
a foreign judgment by avoiding its application or recognition and enforce-
ment. 
3.2 The Krombach v Bamberski judgment – how the doctrine 
operates
In order to show the operation of the concept, the landmark Krom-
bach v Bamberski41  judgment dealing with the public policy exception 
to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the Brussels 
I Regulation will be presented. Mr Krombach was under preliminary in-
vestigation in Germany due to alleged liability for negligence in relation 
to the death of Mr Bamberski’s daughter. The investigation was discon-
tinued, but on Mr Bamberski’s initiative the proceedings were started in 
France where jurisdiction was based on the victim’s French nationality. 
In the proceedings, Mr Krombach did not appear in person and was sub-
ject to contempt proceedings in which his counsel was not allowed to ap-
pear. Mr Krombach was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and Mr 
Bamberski was given monetary compensation. The case only deals with 
34 Succession Regulation (n 30).
35 P Jenard, ‘Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments 
in civil and commercial matters (signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968)’ (Jenard Report) 
OJ C59/1, 3-6.
36 Lisbon Treaty (n 1), Recital 13 of the Preamble.
37 Paul Beaumont and Emma Johnston, ‘Can Exequatur Be Abolished In Brussels Whilst 
Retaining a Public Policy Defence?’ (2010) 6 JPIL 247, 277-278. According to Lopez-Tar-
ruella (n 17) 127, if the law regulated by the Brussels I Regulation becomes harmonised, no 
public policy exception will be necessary.
38 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil 
and commercial matters (recast) OJ L351/1, arts 45 and 46.
39 Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (6th edn, Mohr Siebeck 2006) para 36 I.  
40 Only the effect of recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment can violate the 
public policy, not the foreign judgment itself. Jenard Report (n 35) 44.
41 Krombach (n 16).
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the civil implications of the criminal judgment, ie the monetary compen-
sation given to Mr Bamberski for the loss of his daughter, since crimi-
nal proceedings fall out of the scope of the application of the Brussels I 
Regulation.  When the recognition and enforcement of the judgment was 
sought in Germany, the appeal came to the Bundesgerichtshof (German 
Supreme Court) due to the violation of the right to a fair trial since Mr 
Krombach was not heard during the proceedings.
The German court stayed the proceedings and referred three ques-
tions to the CJEU. The national court wanted to know whether the public 
policy exception under the then applicable Brussels Convention42 may be 
interpreted to encompass firstly the fact that the foreign jurisdiction was 
based on exorbitant rules and secondly the violation of the right to a fair 
trial. Regarding the first question, the CJEU decided that Member States 
are not allowed to review a foreign court’s jurisdiction as the Convention 
itself says in Article 28, even if the jurisdiction is wrongly based solely 
on the victim’s nationality.43 With regard to the second part, the CJEU 
decided that Member States may interpret the notion in accordance with 
their own conceptions, but the limits are to be determined by the CJEU 
itself, so public policy is ‘no longer a purely domestic matter’.44 It was 
stated that domestic public policy is endangered when the recognition 
and enforcement of a judgment ‘would be at variance to an unacceptable 
degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought 
inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle’.45 Since the ‘right to 
a fair trial occupies a prominent position in the organisation and con-
duct of a fair trial and is one of the fundamental rights deriving from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States’,46 the CJEU al-
lowed the refusal of recognition and enforcement of a judgment issued in 
violation of this right. The third question was a combination of the first 
two questions and was not answered since the second one had been an-
swered positively.
Although the case was decided under the Brussels Convention, 
there should be continuity of case law between the Convention and the 
Regulation. As stated in falco Privatstiftung,47 the two instruments follow 
the same structure and principles. Looking at the public policy exception 
specifically, the provision retains the same structural position within the 
42 Brussels Convention (n 3) art 27(1).
43 Krombach (n 16) para 33.
44 Manuel Rui Moura Ramos, ‘Public Policy in the Framework of the Brussels Convention: 
Remarks on Two Recent Decisions by the European Court of Justice’ [2000] YPIL 25, 28.
45 Krombach (n 16) para 37.
46 Krombach (n 16) para 38.
47 In case C-533/07 Falco Privatstiftung and Thomas Rabitsch v Gisela Weller-Lindhors 
[2009] ECR I-03327, paras 48-51. 
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Regulation as one of the few very limited grounds for refusal of recogni-
tion and enforcement of a foreign judgment.48 The wording has changed, 
since the Regulation added the word ‘manifestly’ to the expression ‘con-
trary to public policy’. This change is irrelevant for the continuity of case 
law because public policy was used only in ‘exceptional cases’49 even un-
der the Brussels Convention and it is thought that a very restrictive inter-
pretation existed even before the inclusion of that word.50  The inclusion 
only strengthens the point that this restriction of free movement of judg-
ments should be invoked in exceptional circumstances.51 
The Krombach judgment gives limited guidance to Member States on 
what constitutes infringement of public policy. In order for public policy 
to be justly invoked, three cumulative requirements have to be fulfilled: 
that there is a notable discrepancy between the rule applied in the state 
of origin and a rule of the state of recognition, that there is a violation of a 
fundamental principle in the state of recognition and enforcement due to 
that very discrepancy, and that this violation of a fundamental principle 
constitutes a ‘manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the 
legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought’.52 The Court put 
forward the limits of the notion, leaving Member States to decide what 
is essential for their legal order.53 This essentiality criterion is the main 
tool of discretion given to Member States, which will enable them to cre-
ate their own public policy depending on different features of their legal 
order. Still, the Member States cannot use the discretion too freely seeing 
that the Court has given a strict interpretation of public policy.
Now the question arises whether one could claim that this public 
policy exception is equal or applied in an equal fashion to the judgments 
public policy. Prima facie estimation could lead to the conclusion that 
since the purpose is similar, that is, restricting freedom of movement on 
the basis of a violation of fundamental principles or the ‘public good’,54 as 
stated in Van Duyn, the usage in both areas should be the same. How-
ever, it will be shown that although similar, the uses of public policy in 
48 Compare art 27 of the Brussels Convention (n 3) and art 34 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(n 4). 
49 Krombach (n 16) para 44;  Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, ‘Report on the Ap-
plication of Regulation Brussels I in the Member States (Heidelberg Report)’ Study JLS/
C4/2005/03 Final Version September 2007, para 543 <http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/
news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf> accessed 5 June 2014.
50 Haris P Meidanis, ‘Public Policy and Ordre Public in the Private International Law of the 
EU: Traditional Positions and Modern Trends’ (2005) 30 ELR 95, 101.
51 Christopher M V Clarkson and Jonathan Hill, The Conflict of Laws (4th edn, OUP 2011) 
51.
52 Krombach (n 16) para 37.
53 Meidanis (n 50) 101-102.
54 Van Duyn (n 15) para 18.
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the two areas are not identical. But first, several types of public policy will 
be demonstrated and their use in the four freedoms and in the judgments 
public policy will be evaluated.
4. Which public policy?
4.1 Domestic, international and purely international public policy
Public policy is always national and protects domestic interests.55 
However, there are several types or levels of public policy occurring in 
each State. In private international law, there is a distinction between 
so-called ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ public policy which comes down 
to the level of protection of the endangered interest.56 In cases with a 
foreign element, only the violation of the international level of national 
public policy may be invoked since it aims to protect the very essential 
values that should not be neglected even in internationalised disputes.57 
This is analogous to the requirement of restrictive interpretation; only the 
very basic values deserve protection when restrictions within the EU are 
considered. Therefore, in both areas of usage of public policy, only the 
international one is to be protected.58 
There is, however, another type of public policy – ‘purely interna-
tional’ – which is at stake when an international law obligation or a rule 
would be infringed if the judgment was enforced or if the four freedoms 
were allowed free circulation. This is also part of the national public pol-
icy, but there is a specific source of obligation behind the domestic inter-
est, ie an international law obligation that needs to be respected by the 
state concerned.59 It was submitted that this type of public policy could 
also be protected in the case of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments.60 Beaumont and Johnston give an example of a mistaken 
breach of a UN sanction in the Member State of origin which could lead 
to enforcement in another Member State if purely international public 
policy is not invoked.61 There is no reason why violation of such a public 
policy could not lead to restrictions to the four freedoms. An example 
55 Van Duyn (n 15) para 4 for the four freedoms, and art 34/1 of the Brussels I Regulation 
(n 4) for the fifth freedom.
56 It was firstly developed in France as a distinction between ‘ordre public interne’ and ‘ordre 
public externe’. Kent Murphy, ‘The Traditional View of Public Policy and Ordre Public in Pri-
vate International Law’ (1981) 11 GaJICL 591, 596.
57 Francq (n 11) paras 16-17.
58 Christoph Liebscher, ‘European Public Policy: A Black Box?’ (2000) 17 J Intl Arb 73, 74.
59 Cf Luigi Fumagalli, ‘EC Private International Law and the Public Policy Exception: Mod-
ern Features of a Traditional Concept’ (2004) 6 YPIL 171, 179.
60 Alex Mills, ‘The Dimensions of Public Policy in Private International Law’ (2008) 4 JPIL 
201, 215; Beaumont and Johnston (n 37) 258-259.
61 Beaumont and Johnston (n 37) 259.
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could also be a UN sanction directed against a Member State national 
whose free movement could be restricted on that basis or whose assets 
were frozen so the free movement of capital would be restricted. Still, the 
national court would have to conduct the test given in the CJEU’s case 
law in order to establish whether the public policy exception could be 
used. Already in Kadi, the CJEU made it clear that it has competence to 
review compliance of EU law that transposes international law with some 
other piece of EU legislation,62 and has thus accepted a ‘sharply dualist 
tone in its approach to the international legal order’.63 This means that 
international law norms will ‘gain validity in EU law only if they comply 
with EU constitutional primary law and in particular with EU funda-
mental rights’.64 Although Kadi does not effectively solve the question 
of the hierarchy of norms,65 national courts surely need to observe the 
standard set in the relevant CJEU case law regarding public policy when 
it comes to questions of primary EU law (the four freedoms) and funda-
mental rights (all the five freedoms). 
4.2 European public policy
In Eco Swiss v Benetton,66 the CJEU stated that Article 101 (ex Ar-
ticle 81) of the Lisbon Treaty is to be considered a part of the Member 
States’ public policy.67 The question arose before the Dutch Supreme 
Court, Hoge Raad, whether an arbitral award enforcing a licence agree-
ment should be annulled based on public policy due to a lack of require-
ments under Article 101 of the Treaty (ie notification to the Commission) 
which renders the agreement invalid. Under Dutch law, violation of com-
petition law was not considered to be a violation of national public policy. 
Even more, the sought annulment was time barred according to Dutch 
law since the parties should have started annulment proceedings based 
on the interim award dealing with the same question. The CJEU stated 
that although the national court must consider the application of the 
mentioned provision as part of its national public policy, it is not required 
to review the award if national procedural rules restrain it from doing 
62 Joined cases C-402 & 415/05P Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found v Council & Comm’n 
[2008] ECR I-6351, paras 287-290. 
63 Graine de Burca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After 
Kadi’ (2010) 51 Harv Intl LJ 1, 2.
64 Samantha Besson, ‘European Legal Pluralism after Kadi’ (2009) 5  EuConst 5 237, 245.
65 ibid.
66 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v Benetton International NV ECR [1999] I 
03055.
67 Confirmed in Joined cases C-295/04 to C-298/04 Vincenzo Manfredi v Lloyd Adri-
atico Assicurazioni SpA (C-295/04), Antonio Cannito v Fondiaria Sai SpA (C-296/04) and 
Nicolò Tricarico (C-297/04) and Pasqualina Murgolo (C-298/04) v Assitalia SpA ECR [2006] 
I-06619.
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so. The Court has thus introduced a notion of EU public policy that was 
confirmed in subsequent case law.68
The implications of this decision could be explained in three different 
ways. Firstly, it could be inferred that the CJEU has departed from Krom-
bach and has imposed on national courts the content of public policy cre-
ating a European or EU public policy.69 The other view is that the CJEU 
only did its job in securing the correct interpretation and application of 
EU law by confirming that some EU provisions deserve to be considered 
part of national public policy, which only reiterates Krombach and the 
CJEU’s role in setting limits to the notion.70 Thirdly, Haegen sees the Eco 
Swiss judgment as CJEU’s manipulation of the public policy device since 
the arbitrators may never request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU 
and this was the way to ensure the compliance of arbitral proceedings 
with EU law.71 Perhaps the middle approach would be the best – EU law 
is part of national law, and since only the CJEU is to interpret EU law, 
it is to determine which of it is to be considered part of national public 
policy.72 This interpretation does not support the creation of a European 
public policy as opposed to a national one; it just acknowledges that 
there is an EU law level in national public policy.73 This is confirmed in 
the Giuliano and Lagarde Report on the Rome Convention.74 Looking at 
Eco Swiss together with Maxicar where the CJEU decided that the mis-
application of the Treaty provisions does not always form a violation of 
national public policy,75 it is seen that not each and every norm coming 
from the EU, especially the Treaty, forms such a fundamental rule to 
place it within the notion of public policy.76 It is always to be kept in mind 
68 Case C-168/05 Elisa María Mostaza Claro v Centro Móvil Milenium SL [2006] ECR 
I-10421; Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira 
[2009] ECR I-9579.
69 See George A Bermann, ‘Reconciling European Union Law Demands with the Demands 
of International Arbitration’ (2011) 34 Fordham Intl LJ 1193, 1202; Olivier van der Haegen, 
‘European Public Policy in Commercial Arbitration: Bridge Over Troubled Water?’ (2009) 16 
MJ 449, 453 fn 14. 
70 Meidanis (n 50) 105.
71 Haegen (n 69) 456.
72 Cf Fumagalli (n 59) 179-180.
73 Paolo Bertoli, ‘European Integration and Private International Law’ (2006) 8 YPIL 375, 
409.
74 ‘It goes without saying that this expression [ordre public] includes Community public 
policy, which has become an integral part of the public policy (‘ordre public ) of the Member 
States of the European Community’. M Giuliano and P Lagarde, ‘Report on the Convention 
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations’ (1980) OJ C282/1, 38.
75 Case C-38/98 Régie nationale des usines Renault SA v Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento 
[2000] I-02973, paras 31-34.
76 George A Bermann, ‘Navigating EU Law and the Law of International Arbitration’ (2012) 
28 Arb Intl 397, 418.
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that the notion of public policy deserves a very narrow application.77 In 
any case, the concept of EU public policy protects the EU and its inter-
ests primarily, whereas ‘classical’ public policy protects national law and 
interests.78
In view of the foregoing, the question is whether there could be an 
EU layer of the four freedoms public policy.79 It is plausible that the CJEU 
would accept the public policy exception, for example, to restrict the pro-
vision of services from a company that has unduly been given state aid. 
However, it is to be kept in mind that in any application of public policy 
its violation must be obvious and severe. In the given example, the na-
tional court surely would not be the one to investigate whether the con-
ditions have been fulfilled. It could rely on public policy if a breach of 
the procedure has already been established or if the breach is manifest 
enough to allow reliance on the public policy exception. 
4.3 Substantive v procedural public policy 
In private international law, there is a distinction between substan-
tive and procedural public policy. The classification depends on whether 
the substantive law standards or procedural law standards are in ques-
tion. In the operation of public policy as a restriction to the fifth freedom, 
it is more often the case that the procedural aspect is endangered.80 The 
reason for this could firstly be found in the similarity of civil and commer-
cial law and principles of Member States. Secondly, the prohibition of the 
review of merits under Articles 35 and 45/2 of the Brussels I Regulation 
leads to it being virtually impossible to claim violation of the substantive 
aspect of public policy.81 However, it is possible for substantive public 
policy to be at stake when, for example, the original judgment is obtained 
by fraud, and which is discovered only after the judgment has been is-
sued.82 The most frequent consideration under procedural public policy 
is what is encompassed by the right to a fair trial expressed in Article 6 
of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms.83 It was also confirmed by the CJEU that the Convention and the 
77 According to Bermann (n 76) 419-120, EU public policy is interpreted more widely than 
private international law policy should be.
78 For some authors it is questionable whether anything is left for the Member States to 
protect at all. See eg Kassedijan (n 8).
79 For a general plea for an EU public policy, see Corthaut (n 2).
80 Burkhard Hess and Thomas Pfeiffer, ‘Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception as 
referred to in EU Instruments of Private International and Procedural Law’ (European Par-
liament 2011) <www.europarl.europa.eu/studies> accessed 5 June 2014, ch 4.1.1.
81 Francq (n 11) para 20.
82 Jan-Jaap Kuipers, ‘The Right to a Fair Trial and the Free Movement of Civil Judgments’ 
(2010) 6 Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 41-42.
83 Hess and Pfeiffer (n 80) ch 4.1.2.
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case law interpreting it are of high importance when violations of human 
rights in respect of public policy restriction are questioned. 84
On the other hand, if the distinction is transposed to the four free-
doms public policy, substantive public policy will most probably more of-
ten be at stake.85 When applying the four freedoms public policy, there is 
no process relevant to free movement and that is why procedural stand-
ards will have lesser importance. This difference is based on the nature 
of what should circulate freely. In the case of judgments, there is always 
a procedural aspect preceding the judgments themselves. This is not the 
case with goods, services, workers and capital. However, it is possible for 
some procedural standards to be infringed, for example in the process 
of the formation of a company which would make another Member State 
prohibit the free movement of services provided by that company. It is 
unlikely that violations of such standards would be so grave as to violate 
public policy, especially its procedural character. Even more, even if the 
procedural rules are breached, the result is a favourable one since the 
person is allowed to exercise the right of establishment, and depriving the 
services of free movement would only increase the injustice and contra-
vene the EU’s aims.
In its Van der Weerd86 judgment, the CJEU gave an interpretation 
which could in part explain how the four freedoms procedural public 
policy should function. The dispute arose in the Netherlands between 
cattle breeders and the Minister for Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 
in the application of measures dealing with the slaughter of cattle due 
to alleged disease. Although only one Member State was involved and 
the dispute deals with the relation of public policy and EU law, it might 
give some answers. The main question is whether the national court can 
invoke EU law ex officio in order to review the national administrative 
procedure. The CJEU stated that the national court has an obligation to 
review the relevant procedure only if the contrary would violate its public 
policy. However, if the national concept of public policy does not compel it 
to do so ex officio, neither does the principle of equivalence.87 According to 
84 Krombach (n 15) paras 25-27.
85 The classic examples deal with protection of fundamental freedoms such as dignity 
(Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin 
der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-09609), public order and protection from crime (Case 
C-137/09 Marc Michel Josemans v Burgemeester van Maastricht [2010] ECR I-13019), mon-
etary policy (Case 7/78 Regina v Thompson, Johnson and Woodiwiss [1978] ECR 2247) etc.
86 Joined cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 J van der Weerd and Others, H de Rooy sr and H de 
Rooy jr, Maatschap H en J van ’t Oever and Others and BJ van Middendorp v Minister van 
Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit [2007] ECR I-04233.
87 ibid, para 31. The principle of equivalence means that ‘it is for the domestic legal system 
of each Member State to designate the courts and tribunals having jurisdiction and to lay 
down the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding rights which indi-
viduals derive from Community law, provided, first, that such rules are not less favourable 
than those governing similar domestic actions (...).’. ibid, para 28. 
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AG Maduro, the national court has to determine whether the relevant EU 
rules are protecting the same interest as the national public policy, which 
was not the case in Van der Weerd.88 Transposed to the domain dealt with 
in this contribution, this means that the national court should decide 
under its national concept of public policy whether the foreign procedure 
is to be reviewed and whether the violation is such as to create a breach 
of public policy by looking at the interest that the national public policy 
safeguards and the interest that the foreign procedure violated.  Only if 
the two interests are concurrent and only if the violation is manifest is 
there a violation of the national procedural public policy.
The difference of uses of public policy in the two areas with respect 
to the two elaborated aspects (substantive and procedural) of public poli-
cy lies only in the frequency of the occurrence of one or the other and this 
is consequential to the nature of the judicial process which results in a 
judgment on the one side, and the four basic freedoms on the other side, 
and does not amount to a difference in the operation of the exception.
5. Similarities between the usages of public policy in the two areas
5.1 Restrictive interpretation 
The CJEU has decided that restrictions based on both uses of pub-
lic policy should be interpreted restrictively.89 The wording of the Brus-
sels I Regulation states that the recognition and enforcement of a foreign 
judgment must be ‘manifestly’ contrary to public policy of the forum to 
be refused, whereas the word ‘manifestly’ is lacking from the provisions 
dealing with justifications of restriction of the four freedoms. This might 
suggest that refusal of recognition and enforcement of judgments should 
be interpreted even more restrictively. However, the requirement of mani-
fest breach of the judgments public policy actually stems from the Krom-
bach judgment that was codified in the Brussels I Regulation.90 On the 
other side, strict interpretation of the four freedoms public policy stems 
from the CJEU’s case law which was never codified, but that does not 
make it any less binding. 
Strict interpretation means that the violation in both cases must 
be both obvious or manifest and serious; it has to violate a fundamental 
value or principle. This twofold restriction in reality produces the effect 
that the public policy restriction is only applied in a very limited number 
88 J van der Weerd and Others (n 86), Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, paras 36-39.
89 Four freedoms: Omega (n 85) para 30; Case C-319/06 Commission of the European Com-
munities v Grand Duchy of Luxemburg [2008] ECR I-04323, para 30. Free movement of judg-
ments: Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH v Emilio Boch [1994] ECR I-2237, para 20; 
Krombach (n 15) para 44; Renault v Maxicar (n 74) para 26.
90 See (n 49-51) and the accompanying text.
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of cases. This is in accordance with the basic aim that the EU pursues, 
namely the creation of an internal market through free circulation of the 
four (five) basic freedoms. Since invoking public policy might lead to a 
restriction of the basic freedoms and thereby endanger the EU’s goal of 
eliminating the barriers which divide Europe,91 it is reasonable that a re-
strictive interpretation was employed since, as always, exceptiones sunt 
strictissimae interpretationis. The narrowness of application is mirrored 
in a small number of judgments actually allowing for restrictions based 
on public policy, both regarding the four freedoms and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments.92 This shows that strict interpretation is 
a valuable characteristic since otherwise the States, as well as the par-
ties, might misuse the concept in order to evade their obligations. This 
could be detrimental to the uniform application of EU law, so the correct 
balance needs to be struck. 
5.2 Violation of a fundamental value
When deciding on restrictions of free movement of capital in Scientol-
ogy International, the CJEU observed, actually relying on Rutili93 on free 
movement of workers, that public policy may be ‘relied on only if there 
is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of 
society’.94 In Krombach, on the other hand, the CJEU held that recogni-
tion or enforcement of a foreign judgment may be refused if its effects 
would infringe a fundamental principle and ‘the infringement would have 
to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in 
the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right 
recognised as being fundamental within that legal order’.95 What should 
be emphasised at this point is that public policy may be invoked only if 
there is a violation of a fundamental value, and in both cases fundamen-
tality should be recognised by the Member State. The recognition of such 
fundamentality will usually be indicated in the constitutional order and 
legislation, as well as in the actions taken by the State leadership.96  
91 Lisbon Treaty (n 1), Recital 3 of the Preamble.
92 For the four freedoms, especially free movement of workers, see Dashwood and Wyatt 
(n 18) 483 and for the fifth freedom see Hess and Pfeiffer (n 80) ch 3.2.1. Also, nation-
al case law published on Unalex (available at <http://www.unalex.eu/Judgment/Judg-
mentSearch.aspx> accessed on 24 August 2014) shows that there have been 48 published 
decisions involving the public policy exception from 2008 to 2013. Only in 7 decisions were 
recognition and enforcement refused based on that exception.
93 Case 36-75 Roland Rutili v Ministre de l’intérieur [1975] ECR 01219, para 28.
94 Case C-54/99 Association Eglise de scientologie de Paris and Scientology International 
Reserves Trust v The Prime Minister [2000] ECR I-01335, para 17.
95 Krombach (n 16) para 37.
96 It has to be noted that the mere fact that certain conduct is penalised in the relevant 
Member State does not make such conduct contrary to public policy. Case 16/83 Criminal 
Proceedings against Karl Prantl [1984] ECR 1299, para 33. 
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The CJEU has already confirmed that human rights do present such 
fundamental values and has allowed restriction on free movement of ser-
vices and goods in Omega97 based on violation of human dignity, and 
violation of the right to a fair trial led to non-recognition of a foreign judg-
ment in Krombach. The judgments differ from each other since in Omega 
the public policy violation was strictly based on the German view of hu-
man rights,98 whereas in Krombach the recognition was refused based 
not only on the German but also on the European concept of the right to 
a fair trial.99 Still, in both cases there was a belief that the right in ques-
tion forms a fundamental value, but that might not be the case for all the 
fundamental rights. Although all the Member States are also signatories 
to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (hereinafter: ECHR), the level of protection of human rights varies, 
as seen especially in the French and German example in Krombach. Even 
if the state does not find the right to be so fundamental as to include it 
in its domestic public policy, it cannot avoid encompassing the level of 
protection imposed by the ECHR since it forms a minimum of protection 
of human rights in the Member States,100 and consequently in the EU 
legal order.101 This does not mean that the protection of the rights arising 
from that instrument has to be absolute, but derogations must be in ac-
cordance with the conditions set in it. Only then will circumvention of the 
expected protection of human rights not violate the State’s public policy. 
The same can be said for the Charter on Fundamental Rights.102 
In any case, although a fundamental value has been violated, the 
principle of proportionality has to be observed.103 When deciding on a re-
striction to the four freedoms, national courts must assess whether there 
is a less restrictive measure that would attain the same aim and preserve 
97 Omega (n 85). For a commentary of other cases involving a clash of fundamental rights 
and the four freedoms, see Sybe A de Vries, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic 
Freedoms According to the European Court of Justice’ (2013) 9 Utrecht L Rev 169, 178-183.
98 Omega (n 85) paras 34-39.
99 Krombach (n 16) paras 38-40.
100 Stephen Hall, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and public policy exceptions 
to the free movement of workers under the EEC Treaty’ (1991) 16 ELR 466, 474-475.
101 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2006) 42 EHRR 1, 
paras 160-165.
102 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 18 December 2000 OJ 
C364/01.
103 Fumagalli (n 59) 178. De Vries (n 97) 188-191 holds that the proportionality test func-
tions differently in different cases regarding balancing human rights and fundamental free-
doms. These nuances, however, do not affect the comparison conducted in his paper.
206 Tena Hoško: Public Policy as an Exception to free Movement within the...
the endangered interest.104 AG Maduro explained in Leppik105 the propor-
tionality test to which each restriction has to be subjected in detail. The 
test has four components – the already mentioned necessity component 
(the least restrictive measure), proportionality stricto sensu (the more im-
portant the interest, the greater restriction is allowed), suitability (the 
measure has to be suitable to achieve the desired aim) and there must be 
no arbitrary discrimination in any case. 
A decision on recognition and enforcement of a judgment must also 
be scrutinised by raising the question of whether the restriction in the 
foreign state was proportionate to its goal in order to ascertain whether 
there was a violation of the forum public policy,106 although a detailed 
test for the judgments public policy has not been developed to the same 
extent as the one from Leppik. However, the Leppik conditions are im-
plicitly contained in the public policy exception to the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments. Proportionality stricto sensu was confirmed in 
Gambazzi where the CJEU stated that the sanctions restricting the right 
to defence ‘may not, however, be manifestly disproportionate to the aim 
pursued’.107 The necessity test is contained in Article 48 of the Brussels 
I Regulation which allows for partial enforcement of the judgment whose 
recognition and enforcement is sought.108 Therefore, the Regulation itself 
promotes the application of the least restrictive measure. The suitability 
test is imminent to the refusal of recognition and enforcement of a for-
eign judgment since it reaches the desired goal. The judgment does not 
produce effect in the State of recognition and is thus unable to produce 
harmful effects. The prohibition of arbitrary discrimination relates to the 
whole body of EU law since it forms one of the general principles of EU 
law.109 Therefore, when applying the Brussels I Regulation, the Member 
104 Case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di 
Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, para 37; Case C-348/96 Criminal proceedings against Donatel-
la Calfa [1999] ECR I-00011, paras 7, 9;  Case C-100/01 Ministre de l’Intérieur v Aitor Oteiza 
Olazabal [2002] ECR I-10981, paras 43, 44; Joined cases C-482/01 and C-493/01 Geor-
gios Orfanopoulos and Others and Raffaele Oliveri v Land Baden-Württemberg [2004] ECR 
I-05257, para 99; Omega (n 85) paras 36-38; Case C-434/10 Petar Aladzhov v Zamestnik 
director na Stolichna direktsia na vatreshnite raboti kam Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti 
[2011] ECR 00000, para 42.
105 Case C-434/04 Criminal proceedings against Jan-Erik Anders Ahokainen and Mati Lep-
pik [2006] ECR I-09171, Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro.
106 Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v Daimler Chrysler Canada Inc and CIBC Mellon Trust 
Company [2009] ECR I-02563, paras 32-33; Case C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico 
Investments Ltd [2012] ECR 00000, para 62.
107 Gambazzi (n 106) para 32.
108 ‘1. Where a foreign judgment has been given in respect of several matters and the dec-
laration of enforceability cannot be given for all of them, the court or competent authority 
shall give it for one or more of them. 2. An applicant may request a declaration of enforce-
ability limited to parts of a judgment.’
109 See eg Joined cases 117-76 and 16-77 Albert Ruckdeschel & Co and Hansa-Lagerhaus 
Ströh & Co v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St Annen; Diamalt AG v Hauptzollamt Itzehoe ECR 
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States have to obey the general prohibition of discrimination envisaged in 
the Lisbon Treaty.110 
Proportionality in the context of the four freedoms public policy op-
erates once the need for restriction has been spotted. Only if the restric-
tion is proportionate can it be used. On the other hand, in the judgments 
public policy, the proportionality test forms part both of the establish-
ment of the public policy violation (proportionality strict sensu) and of 
the estimation of the actions to be taken after the violation has been 
established (the necessity test to decide upon partial recognition v non-
recognition). Although proportionality takes place in a different context 
and stage of the cognitive decision-making process in the use of public 
policy in the two areas, it serves the same aim – to balance the restriction 
of the five freedoms and the alleged public policy violation. 
5.3 Time and space variability of the notion and the CJEU’s review 
of limits
The previous sections infer that there is an autonomous framework 
of public policy at the EU level. The CJEU has given some basic guide-
lines as to the conditions which have to be fulfilled to constitute a public 
policy violation. However, the content of that framework has to be deter-
mined based on the specificities of the Member States and their basic 
values in the relevant period, as was decided for both the four freedoms 
and the judgments public policy.111 Meidanis was right to conclude that 
public policy ‘has a chameleon ability to change from country to country 
in terms of method of intervention, terminology, structure, method of cre-
ation and – needless to say – content’.112 The nationality of public policy is 
preserved because, without it, the exception based on public policy would 
in large part become futile. If there was only one public policy concept 
shared by all the Member States, they would not have an opportunity to 
form restrictions based on their particular national values.113 The limits 
of the notion, however, are still set in the EU law and assessed by the 
CJEU114 since it is only its duty to interpret the EU law which aspires to 
create a functional internal market with the four (five) basic freedoms 
operating well.  
[1977] 01753, para 7; Case C-442/00 Ángel Rodríguez Caballero v Fondo de Garantía Sala-
rial (fogasa) ECR [2002] I-11915, paras 30, 32.
110 Lisbon Treaty (n 1) arts 2, 10, 18.
111 Van Duyn (n 15) para 18; Krombach (n 16) para 22.
112 Meidanis (n 50) 99.
113 Mills (n 60) 216.
114 Van Duyn (n 15) para 18; Krombach (n 16) para 23.
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6. Differences between the usages of public policy in the two areas
6.1 Discriminatory nature
Public policy is used to protect the values and principles of the do-
mestic legal order in its use in both areas. There will thus sometimes be 
a certain bias against foreign goods, services, persons, capital or judg-
ments.115 In Van Duyn, the CJEU allowed such a bias to take action. 
Practising the beliefs of the Church of Scientology was not forbidden for 
domestic nationals, but Mrs Van Duyn was still not granted leave to enter 
the United Kingdom due to her prospective employment by that institu-
tion. However, this part of the ruling was implicitly changed in Adoui 
and Cornuaille v Belgium116 since it did not conform to the general pro-
hibition of discrimination.117 In that case, Mrs Adoui and Mrs Cornuaille 
were to be expelled from Belgium since they worked in a bar ‘which was 
suspect from the point of view of morals’,118 although that point of view 
of morals – prostitution – was not prohibited by Belgian legislation. The 
CJEU concluded that no public policy violation can be established if the 
activity in question is allowed for domestic nationals.119 In a fairly recent 
case, Josemans v Maastricht,120 the Court came to a different conclu-
sion, but tried to distinguish it from the Adoui and Cornuaille case. In 
Josemans, the issue was whether the municipality of Maastricht could 
forbid the consummation of marihuana for persons not residing in the 
Netherlands if the consummation is allowed for Netherlands’ residents. 
The Court distinguished this case from the Adoui and Cornuaille case by 
observing that traffic in narcotics, except for medical uses and scientific 
research, is prohibited in all Member States, unlike prostitution. Having 
that in mind, Maastricht has the right to use the public policy exception 
to prohibit non-residents from entering well-known ‘coffee shops’ if their 
large influx actually disturbs public policy by increasing crime and illegal 
drugs sales.121 Without going into a detailed analysis of the reasonable-
ness of this case,122 it can be concluded that in some instances the four 
freedoms public policy may be used as a device of discrimination.
115 Corthaut (n 2) 92 emphasises the existence of bias towards aliens.
116 Adui and Cornuaille (n 19).
117 Barnard (n 19) 482.
118 Adoui and Cornuaille (n 19) para 2.
119 ibid, para 7.
120 Josemans (n 85).
121 ibid, paras 79-84.
122 The case was criticised for the lack of legal reasoning and for the political motivation of 
the decision. See Marc A Jacobs, Precedents and Case-Based Reasoning in the European 
Court of Justice Unfinished Business (CUP 2014) 102.
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On the other side, it is hard to imagine that a Member State would 
refuse recognition of a judgment allowing something that exists and is 
allowed in that Member State.123 To give an example, if the State of rec-
ognition allows multiple damages, it cannot refuse a foreign judgment 
entailing the same level of damages. The public policy exception may be 
used only if recognition and enforcement ‘would be at variance to an un-
acceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement 
is sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle’.124 This re-
quirement is hard to reconcile with the scenario of non-recognition of the 
foreign judgment which entails something allowed in the Member State 
of recognition.125 
To depict this difference, one could say that the uses of public policy 
in the two areas always work as a ‘shield’126 of the domestic system, but 
the shield for the four freedoms may be a bit bigger and thus a bit more 
protective. 
6.2 Content of public policy - economic interest
The CJEU has consistently held that economic interest cannot jus-
tify the restriction of the four freedoms.127 This is quite logical since the 
four freedoms are to be preserved and given priority due to their impor-
tance in an economic union such as the EU, so the protection of econom-
ic interest of one Member State towards the other should not be allowed. 
Otherwise, the creation of the internal market would be at stake since 
every country would be able to restrict the four freedoms by claiming 
economic disturbances that could arise from the free movement.128  The 
CJEU has recently decided that mere invocation of economic interests of 
a State may not constitute a public policy exception for the free move-
123 None of the cases mentioned in the study on public policy by Hess and Pfeiffer (n 80) 
provides such a scenario.
124 Krombach (n 16) para 37.
125 Corthaut (n 2) 186-187.
126 Thomas Pfeiffer, ‘Private International Law’ in Wolfrum (ed), The Max Planck Encyclope-
dia of Public International Law (OUP 2011) para 21 as referred in Hess and Pfeiffer (n 80) 28.
127 Case 352/85 Bond van Adverteerders and others v The Netherlands State [1988] ECR 
02085, para 34; Case C-288/89 Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda and others 
v Commissariaat voor de Media [1991] ECR I-04007, para 11; Case C-158/96 Raymond 
Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] ECR I-01931, para 41; Case C-385/99 VG Mül-
ler-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA and EEM van Riet 
v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen [2003] ECR I-04509, para 72; 
Case C-137/04 Amy Rockler v Försäkringskassan [2006] ECR I-01441, para 24.
128 The Member States have tried, for example, prescribing a mandatory employment form 
in domestic legislation to prevent foreign tourist and travel agencies from concluding a con-
tract for the provision of services in order to secure industrial peace and avoid an impact on 
the economic sector of the State. Case C-398/95 Syndesmos ton en Elladi Touristikon kai 
Taxidiotikon Grafeion v Ypourgos Ergasias [1997] ECR I-03091.
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ment of judgments.129 However, having in mind that a party’s interests 
are usually directly protected when the judgments public policy is in-
voked, there seems to be no reason why economic interest would not be 
allowed under that exception. It is plausible that the CJEU would allow 
the refusal of recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment contain-
ing, for example, excessive damages or excessive lawyer’s fees. In some 
Member States, similar situations already form a public policy violation 
and create a ground for the refusal of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments under the Brussels I Regulation. Examples are France 
where an English judgment was refused since the uninsured employee 
had to pay around 85% of the damage whereas the employer was to bear 
only the rest, and Sweden where the recognition of a judgment was re-
fused due to the level of damages awarded.130 It is true that the economic 
interest of a Member State is in question when talking about the four 
freedoms, whereas the fifth freedom concerns an individual’s economic 
interest. Therefore, this difference in content mainly arises from the dif-
ferent manner of operation of the two public policy exceptions.
6.3 Whose human rights are at stake?
When it comes to human rights protection, there are some differ-
ences in the operation of the public policy restriction. The restriction of 
free movement of goods, services, persons or capital justified by the pub-
lic policy of a Member State offers ‘a protection for the sovereignty of the 
various Member States’.131 The four freedoms public policy juxtaposes 
the policy of a Member State to the individual interest of other Member 
States’ nationals, goods, services and capital. The objects of protection 
are public/state interests that concern the whole society, as might be 
seen in the CJEU’s case law related to that area in which the Member 
States mainly invoke provisions of public law that tend to protect the 
interests of all the citizens.132 It will rarely be seen that the four basic 
freedoms are restricted based on a threat to the human rights of only one 
individual, even if they form the fundamental principles of a legal order. 
On the other hand, when talking about public policy as a justification for 
the restriction of free movement of judgments, one can often pinpoint an 
individual whose rights are at stake, especially concerning human rights 
129 Case C-302/13 flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines AS, in liquidation v Starptautiskā lidosta Rīga 
VAS and Air Baltic Corporation AS (Third Chamber, 23 October 2014).
130 Hess and Pfeiffer (n 80) ch 3.2.2. 
131 Corthaut (n 2) 79.
132 Examples are rules on the refusal of residence (Adoui and Cornuaille (n 19) or expulsion 
(Calfa (n 104)) regarding free movement of workers; rules on prior authorisation of capital 
investments regarding free movement of capital (Scientology International (n 94)), and rules 
on labelling with age classification (Case C-244/06 Dynamic Medien [2008] ECR I-505) re-
garding free movement of workers.
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related to procedural standards which are often invoked under the judg-
ments public policy exception.133 It can thus be said that the judgments 
public policy actually has the strength to lift the protection of an individ-
ual’s human rights to the public sphere. There must still be a belief that 
the right concerned is recognised by the State as essential. 
The contrast is best seen in cases of violation of human rights, 
whereas the difference might diminish in other areas. In Krombach, an 
individual’s right to a fair trial was violated which led to a refusal of rec-
ognition of the foreign judgment. In Omega, a British company’s freedom 
of movement was restricted since their product, ‘laserdrome’, violated 
human dignity, a principle of the German constitutional order. It is to be 
noted that the dignity of all the members of German society, not a par-
ticular individual, was endangered. This difference is a product of the fact 
that recognition and enforcement of a judgment primarily concerns the 
parties to the judgment. 
7. Assessment of the comparison
Restriction of the five basic freedoms encompassed in the notion of 
public policy is not easily determinable due to its variability in time and 
space which might lead to a lack of predictability and legal certainty in 
its operation. It can appear that public policy is the Procrustean bed, 
one notion to fit all intentions and applications. However, the truth is 
far from what it seems to be at first sight. The public policy exception is 
actually interpreted very strictly, which makes it operative in a very small 
number of cases. The CJEU’s and national case law has shown that the 
public policy exception is reluctantly applied in both its areas of usage.134 
In order to trigger the application of public policy, there must be a viola-
tion of a fundamental value, and this fundamentality must be scrutinised 
carefully. A good explanation of what may be considered to be public 
policy is that it ‘refers to the minimal conditions that make possible the 
existence of the legal order and the State community to which it applies 
while they protect their integrity’.135 Therefore, the lack of predictability is 
diminished if one keeps in mind that the very base of a legal system must 
be endangered in order to invoke public policy.
It has been shown that the usages of the notion in the two areas 
elaborated in this paper are applied in a similar manner – their scope is 
interpreted restrictively, they concern a violation of a fundamental value/
interest/right and are both determined in a national context at the in-
133 Hess and Pfeiffer (n 80) ch 3.2.2. 
134 See (n 92).
135 Elena Rodriguez Pineau, ‘European Union International Ordre Public’ (1993-1994) 3 
SYIL 43, 44.
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ternational level. The exact content of the notion is in both cases unde-
terminable in advance, precisely due to its variability.136 Some areas, like 
human rights, overlap and their violation may constitute a violation of 
public policy in both areas. Therefore, it is clear that the technique of ap-
plication is similar, if not even identical.
However, the differences come into play when the addressees of hu-
man rights are considered. The judgments public policy will often protect 
the rights of the party subject to the judgment whose recognition and 
enforcement are being sought, whereas the four freedoms public policy 
protects society as a whole. Similarly, it is clear that the four freedoms 
public policy is never to be invoked to protect economic concerns, which 
is not true for the judgments public policy since it may protect the party’s 
economic interest by protecting the State’s public policy. Additionally, the 
four freedoms public policy might sometimes protect domestic nationals 
or residents and discriminate against foreign ones, which is unlikely for 
the judgments public policy.
This surely does not mean that there are several public policy con-
cepts, only that the uses of the concept in various areas ask for different 
methods of operation. It is no exaggeration to say that each and every 
use137 will demand strict interpretation and violation of a fundamental 
value and that there will most probably be some differences in the opera-
tion of the device and in its content. 
8. Conclusion
The free movement of judgments is considered to be the fifth freedom 
which implies that it stands side by side the four basic freedoms. How-
ever, even this limited examination shows that no strict parallels should 
be drawn. EU law uses the same concept to justify the restriction of all 
five freedoms, but the concept of public policy does not operate identi-
cally in both cases. Only its international level is used, and in both areas 
the exception should operate similarly regarding its purely international 
and European level. The substantive and procedural dimensions show 
that specificities of the uses in the two areas ask for the more frequent oc-
currence of different dimensions. A restrictive interpretation is required 
regarding uses in both areas, and there should always be a violation of 
a fundamental value or principle that has to be determined according to 
each Member State’s view. Although there are similarities in the applica-
tion and determination of the ‘two public policies’, nuances between them 
mean that they merely overlap, but that they are never equal. Differences 
136 ibid 50.
137 Another use may be found in, for example, the Succession Regulation (n 30), Rome I 
Regulation (n 31), Rome II Regulation (n 32), Rome III Regulation (n 33).
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exist regarding the protection of economic interest, the discriminatory 
nature of the four freedoms public policy and the protection of the funda-
mental rights of the addressees. Still, there is just one concept of public 
policy in the EU, or, better to say, each Member State has its own and 
only one public policy. The fact that it operates differently in different 
areas does not make it split into or create two separate notions. The core 
of public policy is always the same – protecting all or certain citizens’ 
interests and rights. 
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